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Abstract
Perceptual decisions are based on the temporal integration of sensory evidence for different
states of the outside world. The timescale of this integration process varies widely across
behavioral contexts and individuals, and it is diagnostic for the underlying neural mecha-
nisms. In many situations, the decision-maker knows the required mapping between per-
ceptual evidence and motor response (henceforth termed “sensory-motor contingency”)
before decision formation. Here, the integrated evidence can be directly translated into a
motor plan and, indeed, neural signatures of the integration process are evident as build-up
activity in premotor brain regions. In other situations, however, the sensory-motor contin-
gencies are unknown at the time of decision formation. We used behavioral psychophysics
and computational modeling to test if knowledge about sensory-motor contingencies affects
the timescale of perceptual evidence integration. We asked human observers to perform
the same motion discrimination task, with or without trial-to-trial variations of the mapping
between perceptual choice and motor response. When the mapping varied, it was either in-
structed before or after the stimulus presentation. We quantified the timescale of evidence
integration under these different sensory-motor mapping conditions by means of two ap-
proaches. First, we analyzed subjects’ discrimination threshold as a function of stimulus du-
ration. Second, we fitted a dynamical decision-making model to subjects’ choice behavior.
The results from both approaches indicated that observers (i) integrated motion information
for several hundred ms, (ii) used a shorter than optimal integration timescale, and (iii) used
the same integration timescale under all sensory-motor mappings. We conclude that the
mechanisms limiting the timescale of perceptual decisions are largely independent from
long-term learning (under fixed mapping) or rapid acquisition (under variable mapping) of
sensory-motor contingencies. This conclusion has implications for neurophysiological and
neuroimaging studies of perceptual decision-making.
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Introduction
A hallmark of perceptual decision-making is the integration of evidence for different states of
the world [1]. Imagine driving your car on a rainy day and reading a street sign to decide whether
to turn left or right. Since the “sensory evidence” you are trying to interpret is noisy (i.e., it fluctu-
ates randomly), you can improve your judgment by integrating evidence over time [1,2,3].
The timescale of this integration process is a key psychophysical parameter quantifying per-
ceptual decision-making as it reflects the network mechanisms underlying the accumulation of
sensory information in the brain [4–7]. While many studies of non-sensory (top-down) effects
in perceptual decision-making have focused on strategic adjustments of the decision threshold
that terminates the decision process [3,6,8,9,10], only few previous studies have investigated di-
rect top-down effects on the evidence integration process per se, as indicated by the integration
timescale [11–14]. Only two of these studies were conducted in human observers [11,13]
whose integration mechanisms may differ from those of other species [15]. Here, we examined
the effect of one important top-down factor that has not been previously examined: knowledge
of sensory-motor contingencies.
In the above example, the integrated evidence is continuously mapped onto a plan to
select and execute a motor movement. The same holds for most previous neurophysiological
laboratory studies of perceptual decision-making [1,16,17,18]. Under such conditions, build-up
signatures of evidence integration are found in brain regions involved in action planning. In
particular, when perceptual choices are reported as saccades [12,19,20] or hand movements
[21,22] choice-specific activity ramps up in the corresponding (pre-)motor brain regions. These
premotor build-up signatures are not evident if the sensory-motor contingencies are broken up
by instructing the mapping between perceptual choice and motor response only after stimulus
presentation [12], or by eliminating the motor response altogether (in a covert counting task)
[23]. This raises the question whether knowledge about sensory-motor contingencies might
also improve (i.e., prolong) integration timescales observed behaviorally. Further, it has been
shown that learning of fixed sensory-motor contingencies (over hundreds of trials or more) im-
proves the selectivity of the read-out of sensory information by the association cortex [24,25].
But it remains unknown whether such learning also improves the integration timescale.
We addressed these questions in six human observers performing the same motion discrim-
ination task under three different sensory-motor mapping conditions. In one experiment, the
mapping between decision outcome and motor response varied on a trial-by-trial basis. In dif-
ferent conditions, this mapping was instructed before or after stimulus presentation. While the
first condition allowed the integration of evidence directly towards action plans, the second did
not. We found that integration timescales were generally shorter than the maximum stimulus
duration, and thus shorter than the timescale required to maximize the fraction of correct
choices in the task. But integration timescales were indistinguishable between conditions. We
then reasoned that sensory-motor mapping might only improve integration timescales if fixed
over many trials, due to a slow learning process. Thus, we asked the same observers to perform
the task under fixed mapping in another experiment. Again, despite extensive practice, integra-
tion timescales were indistinguishable from the other two conditions. We conclude that the in-
tegration of perceptual evidence does not depend on sensory-motor contingencies.
Materials and Methods
Ethics Statement
The ethical committee of the University of Amsterdam approved the study (reference number
2011-OP-1588). Written informed consent was obtained from all participants.
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Observers
Six healthy human observers were recruited for this study (2 males, mean age: 25; range: 22–29
years). All observers had normal or corrected-to-normal vision. The pool included four observ-
ers who were naïve with respect to the purpose of the experiment, and two authors (P.J. and T.
P). Observers received either course credits or were paid a small amount of money (€10/hour)
for their participation.
Stimuli
We used an established psychophysical approach for quantifying the perceptual evidence inte-
gration timescale [12,13,26–29], which entailed the following two aspects of the sensory input:
First, we systematically manipulated the duration of the stimulus (i.e., the maximal evidence in-
tegration time available to the observer) and prompted the response after that time (“interro-
gation protocol”). Second, we systematically manipulated the strength of the perceptual
evidence to estimate the observer’s perceptual discrimination threshold for each stimulus dura-
tion. This enabled us to quantify discrimination thresholds as function of stimulus duration
(see below).
Using this general approach, we performed two experiments. Below, we first describe all
general aspects, followed by the specifics of each experiment. Motion stimuli consisted of
“random dot kinematograms” (RDK), consisting of 785 white dots (on average) within a cir-
cular aperture 9.1° in diameter (dot density: 12.07 dots per deg2), centered on a red fixation
cross (0.4° x 0.4°), and displayed against a black background. Individual dots subtended 0.04°
x 0.04°. On each frame, the dots were randomly assigned to either a population of “signal
dots” or of “noise dots”. The signal dots were randomly selected on each frame and were dis-
placed from frame to frame with a fixed spatiotemporal offset, creating a coherent motion sig-
nal with upward or downward direction (separated by 180°) and a speed of 2.6°/s. We used
“random position” noise. That is, the noise dots were re-drawn on a randomly selected posi-
tion, creating spatiotemporal white noise, which comprised a mixture of directions and speeds
[30]. On each trial, three different “sets” of RDKs of the selected direction and coherence were
plotted in an interleaved fashion, where the dot pattern from each set was shown for one
frame and followed by the next pattern from the same set only after three successive video
frames, and so forth. This version of the RDK stimulus corresponds to the one used in many
of the seminal monkey physiology studies on temporal integration of visual motion informa-
tion (e.g. [31]). This was to encourage integration of motion information across space and
time. The percentage of coherently moving dots (“motion coherence”; 0.05, 1.26, 3.15, 7.92,
19.91, and 50%), viewing duration (150, 300, 600, 1200, 2400, and 4800 ms), direction (“up/
down”), and “decision-to-response-mapping” (“DR-mapping”; e.g. upward motion left button
and downward motion right button) were randomly chosen on each trial, under the constraint
that each combination of these parameters occurred equally often within a block of 144 trials.
The six coherence levels listed above were determined in extensive pilot sessions, tailored to
sample the full psychometric function for all stimulus durations. New stimuli were generated
for each experimental block, including six different variations of the interleaved RDK
sequences.
Stimuli were displayed on a 22-inch CRT monitor (resolution: 800 x 600 pixels) at a rate of
100 Hz. The viewing distance was 68 cm. Experiments were conducted in a dimly illuminated
room. Subjects were seated in an adjustable chair with their chin resting comfortably in a chin
cup and additional support was provided by a head restraint mounted on the table. The height
of the monitor placed the center of the display at approximately eye level.
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Task and procedure
Throughout all experimental conditions, subjects were required to fixate the red cross in the
center of the screen and classify the net motion in a stimulus as upward (50% of trials) or
downward motion by pressing one of two buttons (left or the right index finger) when a re-
sponse prompt was provided. The RDK presentation was followed by a variable delay interval,
after which the response was prompted. Observers were under no time pressure to respond.
Auditory feedback of 100 ms duration (a 1000 Hz tone) was provided for incorrect responses.
Variable DR-mapping experiment. The decision-response mapping (e.g., left-hand but-
ton press for indicating “upward” choice) varied randomly from trial to trial. We will hence-
forth abbreviate this as “DR-mapping”. The experiment consisted of two conditions, which
differed only in the timing of the cue instructing observers about the DR-mapping, relative to
presentation of the RDK stimuli (Fig 1A and 1B). The cue indicated the motion direction cor-
responding to each response button in terms of two white arrows (one upward, one downward
pointing) presented on the left and right half of the screen (11° from fixation).
In the pre-cueing (“Pre”) condition (Fig 1A), the arrows were presented after a variable peri-
od of fixation for 1000 ms, and were followed by a second random delay (200–400 ms) and the
onset of the motion stimulus (150–4800 ms). After stimulus offset and another random delay
(200–400 ms) the fixation cross turned green, which prompted the subject to report their
choice.
The post-cueing (“Post”) condition was identical, except that DR-mapping cue was pre-
sented after the motion stimulus and second delay (Fig 1B). In both conditions, the inter-trial
intervals were 900 ms. “Pre”- and “Post”-conditions were conducted in alternating blocks of
144 trials (see General design below).
Fixed DR-mapping experiment. This experiment consisted of a single condition, which
was identical to the “Pre”-condition, with the exception that the DR-mapping was kept con-
stant across all trials (Fig 1C). Although the DR-mapping was instructed at the start of the ex-
periment and remained constant thereafter, the DR-cue was shown at the beginning of each
trial to keep the visual input and trial duration identical to the “Pre”- from the variable DR-
mapping experiment. Each subject was first trained on the task for a minimum of 432 trials
and then completed between 2448 and 7632 trials (distributed over 3–9 experimental sessions),
which were used for the analyses reported in this paper.
General design. All statistical analyses reported in this paper were performed within indi-
vidual observers. Given the large number of trials required from each observer per condition
(minimum: 2016) and the clear effect evident in Subjects 1–3 who participated in all conditions
(see Results), the remaining three observers were asked to only participate in a subset of condi-
tions. Subjects 4 and 5 were used to replicate the comparison between “Pre” and “Post”. Subject
6 was used to replicate the comparison between the variable and “Fixed”mappings.
The experimental conditions were arranged as follows. Subjects 1–5 first performed the
Variable DR-mapping experiment, in which they alternated between “Pre” and “Post” condi-
tions in a pseudorandom order. Each experimental session consisted of 6 blocks: 3 blocks of
each condition (“Pre” and “Post”). Subjects 1–3 then performed the Fixed DR-mapping experi-
ment. General order effects would have (if anything) predicted an improvement (prolongation)
of integration timescales in the “Fixed” condition, due to the extensive practice of the task
(under variable and fixed mapping). By contrast, we found no change of integration timescale
in these subjects. Nonetheless, to rule out any order effects, we flipped the order in one addi-
tional observer (subject 6), who started with “Fixed”, followed by “Post”. Each subject was first
trained on the task for a minimum of 432 trials per condition. Subjects then completed between
2110 and 5760 trials of each condition (distributed over 3–7 experimental sessions in total).
Action Planning and Perceptual Choice
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Model-independent analysis of integration timescale
Quantifying psychophysical thresholds. Given the task design (interrogation protocol
with different levels of stimulus strength), our analyses focused on proportion correct data,
rather than response times [3]. We fitted the observers’ proportion of correct choices as a func-
tion of motion coherence, denoted P(C) below, by means of a cumulative Weibull function
[32], separately for each experimental condition and stimulus duration. See Fig 2 for example
fits from one subject in both conditions of Experiment 2. The cumulative Weibull distribution
function was defined as
Pt1tt2 Cð Þ ¼ 0:5þ 0:5 lð Þ 1 exp 
C
a
 b" # !
ð1Þ
Fig 1. Experimental design.On each trial, the observer was required to discriminate the direction (upward
or downward) of the random dot kinematogram (RDK), while fixating the central crosshair. The RDK was
presented for one of a number of different durations and levels of motion strength (A) Variable “Pre” DR-
mapping condition. The DR-mapping cue (two arrows mapping up/down motion directions onto left/right hand
button presses) was presented before the RDK (separated by a variable delay), and it varied randomly from
trial to trial. After another variable delay, a color switch of the fixation cross prompted the observer to indicate
the choice with a button press. (B) Variable”Post” DR-mapping condition. Identical to “Pre”, except that the
DR-mapping cue was presented after the RDK (“Post”). (C) “Fixed” DR-mapping condition. Identical to “Pre”,
except that the DR-mapping cue was kept constant throughout the experiment, enabling long-term learning of
sensory-motor associations.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0129473.g001
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where λ, α and β are free parameters and the value 0.5 represents chance performance. The
lapse rate (λ) represents stimulus-independent errors, corresponding to the fraction of incor-
rect choices at the highest motion strength and longest viewing duration. λ was determined by
ﬁtting eq (1) to data from the longest viewing duration in each experiment, and then inserted
in eq 2 to ﬁnd best ﬁts of α, and β to the data from all conditions. The value of α is the psycho-
physical threshold corresponding to the coherence level that elicits 82% correct responses
when asymptotic performance is perfect (i.e., λ = 0). Parameter β determines the steepness of
the psychometric function for a particular threshold. Best-ﬁtting values for the free parameters
were obtained by means of a maximum likelihood procedure [33]. To obtain the best-ﬁtting
values for the free parameters, we minimized the negative log-likelihood, which yields the exact
same parameters as maximizing the likelihood.
Confidence intervals for the proportion of correct choices were obtained by employing a
non-parametric bootstrap [34], in which the original set of trials was resampled with replace-
ment a large number of times (N = 10,000) and the proportion of correct responses was com-
puted for each iteration. The confidence intervals of the parameters of the cumulative Weibull
functions and of the regression-based threshold vs. duration functions (see below, eqs 2–5)
were obtained by means of a parametric bootstrap procedure [35]. We used a binary process to
generate a new set of data based on the binomially distributed noise and estimated Weibull pa-
rameters from the observed data set. We repeated the maximum likelihood procedure for each
bootstrap iteration to find the best parameter fits for the “mock” data set and calculated the
corresponding parameters anew. The resulting distributions indicated the likely spread of all
parameters for the original data set.
Fitting threshold versus duration functions. Perfect integration predicts a linear decrease
in threshold with duration with a slope of -0.5 in log-log coordinates. A lack of integration pre-
dicts a flat line (slope of 0). Hence, to analyze the dependence of thresholds on duration, we fit-
ted a bilinear function to the log of the best fits of α and viewing duration [26–28]. The slope of
the first line was constrained to -0.5 and the slope of the second line was constrained to 0. We
determined the best fitting value for the intercept β0 of the linear function. The general fit was
evaluated by calculating the sum of squared errors (SSE) and the best fit of the bilinear function
was determined by means of an iterative least squares method [36].
With a number of durations n, the relationship between thresholds and viewing duration
for each i = 1,. . .n was expressed as
yi ¼ b0  0:5log tið Þ þ ei; if log tið Þ  Ai
and
yi ¼ b00 þ ei; if log tið Þ > Ai ð2Þ
where β0 correspond to the y-intercept of the ﬁrst line, b
0
0 corresponds to the y-intercept of the
second line, A represents the abscissa of the joint point. In order to ensure that the two lines
join at the value x = A, we applied the following restriction:
b0  0:5A ¼ b0 þ ei ð3Þ
The error terms (i.e. ei’s for i = 1,. . .n) were independent and identically distributed normal
random variables with mean equal to zero and constant variance. Due to the restriction from
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eq (3), the abscissa of the joint point could be estimated as
A ¼ ðb0  b
0
0Þ
0:5
ð4Þ
Eq (4) held only for cases in which A lied between two consecutive values of log(t), log(tj)
and log(tj+1). In this case, the first line included nj number of log(ti) and log(ai) pairs up to and
including log(tj) and log(aj), whereas the second line included all values from log(tj+1) and log
(aj+1) on to n0j. If the estimated joint point was indeed log(tj), and log(tj+1), we computed the
ordinary least squares solutions and determined the joint point by substituting the observed β’s
with the estimated β’s. The SSE was computed as the sum of the individual SSEs from the two
lines
SSEj ¼
Xj
i ¼ 1
½log aið Þ  ðb0  0:5logðtiÞÞ2 þ
Xn
i ¼ jþ1
½log aið Þ  b002 ð5Þ
If the estimate of the joint point was not between log(tj), and log(tj+1), we modified the com-
putation such that A occurred exactly at log(tj). Since the minimization of SSE in this case is
constrained to only one possible joint point log(tj), this constrained least squares solution was
computed as a modification of the two separate ordinary least squares solutions [36].
In a control analysis, we relaxed the constraints on the slopes of the bi-linear fits, by allow-
ing the first slope to be in the range from -0.5 to 0, and the second slope was constrained to any
value larger than the first slope. These fits required two additional constraints. 1. If the estimat-
ed joint point exceeded the longest signal duration in the experiment, it was set to the longest
signal duration (4.8 s). 2. If the first slope was smaller than 0.001, we assumed that participants
did not integrate and set the joint point to the shortest signal duration of 0.15 s.
Given the six stimulus durations, the joint point could only be estimated for the four inter-
mediate durations, which corresponded to the limited interval 0.3–2.4 s. We verified that in all
cases, the bi-linear fits provided a significantly better match to the data than a single linear fit,
with or without slopes constrained to -0.5 (data not shown). Further, in all cases were the joint
point estimates significantly shorter than the longest possible timescale estimates of 2.4 s (see
Results, Fig 3). Thus, it is unlikely that the short timescale estimates obtained are due to the
limitations of the procedure.
Fig 2. Example psychometric functions of one observer in all conditions. Solid curves are maximum likelihood fits of cumulativeWeibull functions to the
proportion correct data. Vertical dashed lines represent estimated threshold parameters (solid horizontal lines at bottom, 95% confidence intervals). The
horizontal dashed line represents the lapse rate. (A) “Pre”- condition. The performance data and psychometric functions are shown separately for all stimulus
durations. (B) As in A, but for “Post”. (C) As in A, but for “Fixed”.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0129473.g002
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Statistical comparisons of joint points. To compare integration time scales and lapse
rates between conditions within individual observers (i.e., “Pre”- versus “Post”-conditions;
“Post” vs. “Fixed”; “Post” vs. “Fixed”), we compared the joint point estimates A by means of
non-parametric permutation tests [34]. For each permutation, all trials were combined into
one set of Npre/Nfixed + Npost trials and shuffled 10,000 times. Then the shuffled set was split
into 2 sets of Npre/Nfixed and Npost trials, the proportion correct was recalculated and the Wei-
bull functions were fitted to determine the new thresholds and lapse rates. Based on these, A
was iteratively computed to obtain the permutated difference between the two sets. Finally,
we compared the observed difference lapse rates and in A with the permutated differences.
Fig 3. Model-independent characterization of integration timescales. Threshold vs. duration functions from all conditions. Circles represent
psychophysical thresholds for each stimulus duration. Solid lines: best fitting bilinear function, with the slopes constrained to -0.5 (first branch) and 0 (second
branch; see text for details). Error bars, 60% confidence intervals (bootstrap). Inset: bar graphs of the joint point estimates of the best fitting bilinear function.
Error bars, 95% confidence intervals (bootstrap).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0129473.g003
Action Planning and Perceptual Choice
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P-values were obtained by calculating the fractions of repetitions (10,000), in which the abso-
lute value of the permutated difference was larger than the absolute value of the measured
difference.
Computational modeling of psychophysical performance
General model description. We fitted the leaky-competing accumulator model (LCA)
[37,38] to the behavioral data of each individual observer. The LCA is a neurophysiologically
inspired sequential sampling model of decision-making and has successfully accounted for be-
havioral data from a wide variety of perceptual tasks [2]. Similar to other models, LCA assumes
that noisy evidence for different hypotheses is accumulated towards a decision criterion. A sep-
arate accumulator, corresponding to the pooled neuronal activity of a dedicated population,
represents each competing hypothesis. Thus, in choices between two options, two pools of neu-
rons integrate the momentary evidence for each alternative and compete with each other via
lateral inhibition, while their activity is subject to slow decay (“leak”). The activation states of
the accumulators are described by the following finite difference equations:
x1ðt þ 1Þ ¼ maxð0; x1ðtÞ þ Dx1Þ;
x2ðt þ 1Þ ¼ maxð0; x21ðtÞ þ Dx2Þ;
Dx1 ¼ I1  kx1  bx2 þ I0 þ Nð0; sÞ;
Dx2 ¼ I2  kx2  bx1 þ I0 þ Nð0; sÞ:
ð6Þ
In the above equation xi corresponds to the activation states of the accumulator associated
to alternative i. Themax function prevents activation states (which correspond to population
firing rates) from going below a predefined value, implementing in this case a lower reflecting
boundary at 0. Constant input to both accumulators (controlling for the degree of non-linearity
in the activation states) is denoted by I0 while Δ is the momentary change of each accumulator
on each time step. This change or increment is driven by three factors: i) the external input in
favor of the corresponding accumulator, ii) the activation state of the accumulator on the pre-
ceding moment and iii) the activation state of the competing accumulator. The external mo-
mentary input, denoted by Ii, is subject to Gaussian noise fluctuations with zero mean and
standard deviation σ. The accumulators compete with each other via lateral inhibition of
strength β, and their activation is subject to leak of κ. For the interrogation protocol used in
this study, the activation states of the two accumulators are read out at the end of the trial (cor-
responding to the response cue presentation), and the alternative with the highest activation
state, up to that point, is chosen.
In the simulations presented here, we fixed the standard deviation of noise to σ = 1. We fur-
ther assumed that I1 = C × s, with C corresponding to the motion coherence for the corre-
sponding alternative and s being the sensitivity parameter that modulates the signal to noise
ratio. We let I0 be a free parameter, and we assumed that motion coherence is subject to
power-law saturation with exponentm: I1 = C
m × s. The experimental time units were con-
verted into simulation time steps with 1 second corresponding to 250 time-steps. The coher-
ence level (C) was determined by the experimental condition and ranged from 0 (no coherent
motion) to 1 (all dots move coherently towards a given direction). The input to the first unit
(I1) was always proportional to the coherence level c, while the input to the second unit (I2)
was always set to 0. In sum, the decision-making model had five free parameters: inhibition
(β), leak (κ), sensitivity (s), constant activity (I0) and coherence saturation (m).
Model fits to behavioral data. We fitted the model described above to the data of each in-
dividual observer. Specifically, the model was fitted to the individual proportion correct data
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for N coherencies xM duration levels (N = 5 andM = 6). We excluded the lowest coherence
level (0.05) because performance indistinguishable from chance for all durations at that coher-
ence and we found that including this coherence yielded worse fits. Assuming that the correct
responses follow a binomial distribution, we computed the likelihood for a given parameteriza-
tion of the model, for the K = N x M data points as:
L ¼
Yk
i
ni
yi
 
pyi ð1 piÞniyi ð7Þ
where ni was the number of trials for the i-th data point, yi was the corresponding number of
correct responses and pi the probability of correct response predicted by the model (obtained
by running 5000 iterations of the model for the given condition/ parameterization). The cost
function was the negative logarithm of L:
LL ¼  logeðLÞ ð8Þ
and was minimized using SUBPLEX minimization routine [39]. For each subject and each
model we ran the optimization 400 times with starting points randomly sampled from uniform
distributions within a parameter-speciﬁc range.
In order to assess the goodness of fit for the best parameters of a given model, we calculated
the chi-square statistic as follows:
w2 ¼
XK
i ¼ 1
Oi  Eið Þ2
Ei
ð9Þ
where K was the number of bins corresponding to the experimental conditions, Oi was the ob-
served frequency of correct responses at condition i, and Ei the corresponding frequency pre-
dicted by the model. Because the number of experimental and simulated trials was different, Ei
was calculated by multiplying pi (the probability of correct response predicted by the model) by
the number of experimental trials. The chi-square statistic had K-1 degrees of freedom. P-val-
ues indicated the probability that the chi-square statistic is at least as extreme as the obtained
one, under the null hypothesis that the data and the predictions of the model follow the same
distribution. We rejected the null hypothesis at a signiﬁcance level of α = 0.05.
Model-based estimation of integration time constants. In order to obtain a model-based
estimate of the time constant of evidence integration, we fitted shifted exponential functions
[40] to the d’ transformed psychometric functions of the LCA model fits of each observer. The
shifted exponential function has been shown to accurately track the stimulus sensitivity in-
crease as a function of time of human observers [40]. Fitting shifted exponential functions to
the simulated (rather than the measured) d’ vs. duration functions provided more robust time
constant estimates (Fig 4) by discounting noise in the behavioral data. We applied this proce-
dure after ensuring that the LCA provided a reasonable fit to the behavioral (proportion cor-
rect) data of each subject (MLE, χ2 and p values for assessment of goodness of fit). We fitted
the following shifted exponential function to the predicted average sensitivity across all coher-
ences d' (d0 = F-1(0.99pi)) vs. duration (Fig 4):
d
0
tð Þ ¼ D0 1 exp  t  t0
t
  
ð10Þ
with D0 denoting the average asymptotic sensitivity level for all coherences, t0 the period during
which sensitivity was zero and τ the time constant (Fig 5).
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Results
We examined the impact of sensory-motor contingencies [41,42] on the timescale of perceptu-
al evidence integration in a total of six human observers. To this end, we used a standard psy-
chophysical task, coarse discrimination of visual motion direction, and quantified the
integration timescale under variable (Fig 1A and 1B) or fixed (Fig 1C) DR-mapping. For the
variable mapping, the mapping was instructed either before (“Pre”; Fig 1A) or after decision
formation (“Post”; Fig 1B). Subjects 1–3 were asked to perform all three mapping conditions,
to establish the main result in terms of three independent within-subject comparisons. Subjects
4 and 5 were measured to replicate the results of the “Pre” vs. “Post” comparison. Subject 6 was
measured to replicate the result of the variable (only “Post”) vs. fixed comparison.
Fig 4. Model-based characterization of integration timescales. Simulated d’ vs. duration functions, and exponential fits. Filled dots are the best-fitting
LCAmodel estimates for each subject; solid curves: shifted exponential functions on the predicted average sensitivity across all coherences; blue stars:
measured average sensitivity across all coherences. (A) “Pre”. (B) “Post”. (C) “Fixed”.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0129473.g004
Fig 5. Summary of integration times usingmodel-independent (A) andmodel-based (B)
characterization of time-constants. Summary of integration times under the three DR-mappings tested.
The gray horizontal line marks the median, the upper and lower edges of the box mark the 25th and 75th
percentiles, and the whiskers extend to the most extreme data points, excluding outliers. (A) Joint points of
the bilinear fit to threshold vs. duration functions. (B) Time constants derived from LCAmodel fits.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0129473.g005
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Overall performance
In all observers and experimental conditions, performance depended lawfully on both, the
strength and the duration of the visual motion signal (see Fig 2 for an example observer). The
proportion of correct choices was generally about chance-level (~0.5) for the lowest level of co-
herently moving dots (0.05) and about perfect (~1) for the highest coherence level (0.5). This
was true for all stimulus durations, except for the shortest (150 ms), at which even the highest
coherence did not yield perfect performance in some subjects. We quantified the dependency
on motion coherence by fitting cumulative Weibull functions to the proportion correct data.
The psychometric functions generally shifted leftwards with increasing stimulus duration, as
reflected by the decrease of the threshold parameter (inverse of sensitivity; Fig 2), meaning that
observers could integrate the motion information over time and even discriminate patterns
with a low percentage of coherently moving dots. The thresholds reached less then 0.1 motion
coherence in all observers for the longer durations (Fig 3). This decrease of psychophysical
thresholds with stimulus duration is an index of temporal integration of stimulus information
(see below).
To assess whether observers made more “non-perceptual” errors (i.e., choosing the incorrect
buttons irrespective of signal strength) in any of the three experimental conditions, we com-
pared the “lapse rate” estimates (i.e., the upper asymptote of best-fitting cumulative Weibull
functions) between conditions. Lapse rates quantify processes independent of the perceptual
decision per se, such as lapses of attention or motor errors. Lapse rates were generally negligible
in all three conditions (Table 1), and there were no systematic differences between the three
conditions in most observers. One observer (subject 5) exhibited a significant difference in
lapse rates between “Pre” and “Post” (p = 0.02), but also evident in the joint point (see below).
There were also no differences in the overall threshold levels between the conditions when test-
ed separately for all but the first (0.15 s) stimulus durations (Table 2).
In sum, all six observers exhibited a high sensitivity and were able to adjust the sensory-
motor associations and even rapidly (on a trial-by-trial basis) under the variable DR-mappings.
There were no systematic differences in the occurrence of motor errors, as well as in overall
performance, between the three conditions. Finally, the lawful shift in psychometric functions
with stimulus duration indicates that observers indeed integrated stimulus information over
time and thus became better in discriminating motion directions with low coherences the lon-
ger the observation period [12,13,26–28]. We next quantified the timescale of this integration
process, and its dependence on DR-mapping, based on two complementary approaches: a
model-independent and a model-based approach.
Table 1. Lapse rates.
Subject “Pre“ “Post“ “Fixed”
1 0.014 (0.000, 0.033) 0.000 (0.000, 0.004) 0.000 (0.000, 0.008)
2 0.000 (0.000, 0.000) 0.000 (0.000, 0.003) 0.000 (0.000, 0.000)
3 0.011 (0.000, 0.028) 0.000 (0.000, 0.000) 0.006 (0.000, 0.017)
4 0.049 (0.000, 0.070) 0.029 (0.030, 0.062) -
5 0.052 (0.009, 0.070) 0.014 (0.000, 0.029) -
6 – 0.000 (0.000, 0.000) 0.028 (0.000, 0.059)
Numbers are estimates of lapse rate (λ) and by 95% conﬁdence intervals.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0129473.t001
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Model-independent characterization of integration timescales
The model-independent approach was based on the following rationale. The integral of the
“signal” embedded in the noisy stimulus increases linearly with the stimulus duration, while
the “noise” (i.e., standard deviation) increases with the square root of the stimulus duration.
Consequently, the signal-to-noise ratio increases with the square root of duration and perfect
integration of the sensory evidence implies that the observers’ psychophysical threshold (the
inverse of their signal-to-noise ratio) decreases as a function of the square root of stimulus du-
ration, yielding a straight line with a slope of -0.5 on log-log axes. Conversely, no integration of
sensory evidence implies that the observers’ threshold does not change as a function of stimu-
lus duration (i.e., a straight line with a slope of 0). Consequently, integration of evidence across
a limited time window predicts an initial linear decrease of the threshold vs. duration function
with a slope of -0.5, followed by gradual deceleration towards a second (asymptotic) linear por-
tion with a slope of 0. Note that such a timescale limitation may be due to leaky integration
[37,38], or perfect (i.e., without leak) integration towards absorbing bounds [28] (see Discus-
sion). Based on this rationale, the duration situated in between the -0.5- and 0-slope portions
of the threshold vs. duration function can be used as an estimate of the integration timescale.
We fitted bilinear functions to the individual threshold vs. duration functions, whereby the
slope of the first line was constrained to -0.5 and the slope of the second to 0 and used the joint
point between both lines as time scale estimate.
In all three conditions, the threshold vs. duration functions decreased with stimulus dura-
tion, but only for a limited range (Fig 3). The individual joint points ranged from 300 to 870
ms for “Pre” (presumably involving the highest short-term memory demands, see Discussion),
from 300 to 610 ms for “Post”, and from 310 to 580 ms for “Fixed”. Any two frames of one of
the three interleaved sequences of coherent motion were separated by 30 ms (at the monitor re-
fresh rate of 100 Hz; see Materials and Methods), across which the observers’ visual motion
system could pair dots to extract motion. Thus, the physical evidence fluctuated over 30 ms.
Under the assumption that visual cortical regions like MT that encode visual motion track this
stimulus information with high temporal precision [43], the shortest integration timescale ob-
served here (300 ms) implies integration of ten samples of sensory evidence provided by visual
cortex into the decision. The longest timescale of 870 ms corresponds to integration of close to
30 samples of sensory evidence.
Given the experimental design and fitting procedure, possible estimates of the joint point
were confined to the interval 0.3–2.4 s (see Materials and Methods). All joint point estimates in
Table 2. Comparisons of threshold estimates between conditions.
Subject Comparison 0.15s 0.30s 0.60s 1.2s 2.4s 4.8s
1 Pre/Post 0.356 0.002 0.079 0.174 0.204 0.284
Post/Fixed 0.465 0.001 0.436 0.451 0.810 0.237
2 Pre/Post 0.000 0.277 0.002 0.163 0.374 0.363
Post/Fixed 0.001 0.000 0.147 0.070 0.060 0.393
3 Pre/Post 0.004 0.447 0.311 0.090 0.316 0.401
Post/Fixed 0.082 0.069 0.199 0.009 0.352 0.331
4 Pre/Post 0.005 0.293 0.175 0.332 0.403 0.414
5 Pre/Post 0.000 0.004 0.183 0.403 0.393 0.378
6 Post/Fixed 0.000 0.005 0.004 0.230 0.005 0.304
Numbers are p-values based on two-sided permutation tests. Signiﬁcant p-values (after Bonferroni-correction for multiple comparisons) are printed in bold.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0129473.t002
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the insets Fig 3 were shorter than the upper bound of 2.4 s, and the 95% confidence intervals of
these joint point also estimates excluded 2.4 s. Thus, in all cases were the timescale significantly
shorter than the one that would have maximized performance in this task entailing the maxi-
mum stimulus duration of 4.8 s.
In sum, all subjects showed temporal integration of perceptual evidence, but their integra-
tion timescale were consistently smaller than the optimal timescale for this task (defined as the
timescale that would have maximized the overall fraction of correct choices). Possible mecha-
nistic accounts of the timescale limitation are described in Discussion. We next explored if and
how the timescale was affected by our manipulations of the sensory-motor contingencies.
Integration timescale for “Pre” vs. “Post” under variable DR-mapping. If the integra-
tion timescales depended on subjects’ ability to directly translate the integrated evidence into
an action plan, then precluding the sensory-motor contingency in the “Post”-condition might
be expected to shorten the integration timescale, relative to the “Pre”-condition. We found no
consistent evidence for this scenario. Only one observer (subject 5 who also had a difference in
lapse rates; Table 1) exhibited a significant difference in joint points between “Pre”- and
“Post”-conditions (p< 0.01; two-tailed permutation test). In the remaining four observers
(subjects 1–4) the joint points did not differ significantly between “Pre”- and “Post”-(range of
p-values: 0.07–0.37; two-tailed permutation test).
Separate bi-linear fits with relaxed constraints on the two slopes (see Materials and Meth-
ods) yielded qualitatively identical results. The joint point estimates obtained from this proce-
dure were generally less precise (larger confidence intervals, data not shown). Importantly,
however, there was again no robust difference between joint points from the different condi-
tions in all of the five observers (range of p-values across subjects 1–5: 0.09–0.77; two-tailed
permutation test). Taken together, the results suggest that the evidence integration timescale is
largely independent of the “Pre” vs. “Post” condition.
Integration timescale for fixed vs. variable DR-mapping. In previous studies reporting
neural signatures of evidence integration in brain regions involved in motor planning [12,19–
22,44,45], subjects were typically practiced with one specific sensory-motor contingency for at
least hundreds of trials. It is possible that sensory-motor contingencies only improve the inte-
gration timescale after extensive practice, due to slow learning mechanisms. The trial-to-trial
variation of DR-mapping in the “Pre-”condition of the previous experiment may have not have
enabled such learning and, therefore, no improvement in integration timescale. To test this
idea, we next explored the effect of long-term practice of one specific fixed DR-mapping on the
integration timescale (Fig 1C), and compared this with the timescale under the variable DR-
mapping.
The joint points obtained from the constrained fits (first slope: -0.5, second slope: 0) were
statistically indistinguishable between the “Fixed” and “Pre” (range of p-values across three ob-
servers: 0.07–0.19; two-tailed permutation test) and the “Fixed” and “Post” conditions (range
of p-values across four observers: 0.31–0.70; two-tailed permutation test) and. The bi-linear fits
with relaxed constraints on the slopes yielded similar results: There was no significant differ-
ence in the joint points for two out of three observers in the “Fixed” vs. “Pre” comparison (sub-
ject 1: p = 0.81; subject 2: p = 0.02; subject 3: p = 0.21) and three out of four observers in the
“Fixed” vs. “Post” comparison (subject 1: p = 0.41; subject 2: p = 0.68, subject 3: p = 0.66; sub-
ject 6 p< 0.01. Thus, even extensive practice of a specific sensory-motor association across sev-
eral thousands of trials did not seem to robustly improve the temporal integration process.
Model-based characterization of integration timescales. One concern may be that our
model-independent assessment of integration timescale may not have been sufficiently sensi-
tive to reveal subtle effects of the sensory-motor contingencies. To address this, and to obtain a
more theoretically motivated estimate of the integration timescale, we used a computational
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model of the decision process to fit the behavioral performance data (see Materials and Meth-
ods). The LCA is a neurophysiologically inspired model of the collective dynamics of two pop-
ulations of “decision neurons”, which has been successfully applied to behavioral data from a
wide variety of decision tasks [2,37,38,40]. For our interrogation protocol, the model assumed
that the observers kept integrating for the whole stimulus interval and made a decision in favor
of the alternative with the largest integrated evidence after that interval. Limitations of integra-
tion time scale resulted from the balance between “leaking away” of past evidence (biasing
choices towards the most recent evidence) and mutual inhibition (biasing choices towards the
early evidence).
The LCA model provided a reasonable fit to the behavioral performance of all observers in
all three experimental conditions (Table 3). The goodness of fit was assessed by means of com-
paring the empirical and model-predicted psychometric functions using the chi-square statistic
(see Materials and Methods). For an alpha value of 0.05, the null hypothesis that the two com-
pared distributions (e.g. psychometric functions) are the same was not rejected for any of the
participants (p>0.95 for all participants, see Table 3).
We used the model with the best-fitting parameters for each observer to generate accuracy
(d') vs. duration functions and fitted the average (across coherence levels) sensitivity with a
shifted exponential function (Fig 4). The LCA fit of subject 4 in the “Pre”-condition was invari-
ant to increases of duration and thus meaningful exponential fits could not be obtained. For
the remaining subjects and conditions the obtained time constants were typically around 200
ms (Table 4, Fig 5B), consistently shorter than the around 500 ms timescale estimates obtained
from the bi-linear fits (compare Fig 5A and 5B). This difference is expected since the time con-
stant of the exponential fit represents the time it takes for the sensitivity to reach ~62% of its as-
ymptotic value while the joint point indicates the exact moment of asymptotic saturation; by
simulating a leaky integrator model we confirmed that the bilinear joint point is expected to be
2–2.5 times higher than the exponential time constant. The exact, analytical correspondence
between the two measures of integration timescale should be addressed in future theoretical
work. Despite the quantitative difference between the two timescale measures, there was a con-
sistent qualitative correspondence across subjects (compare insets in Fig 3 with Table 4).
Most importantly, in line with the analysis of joint points, comparison of the model-based
integration time constants between conditions did not yield any significant difference between
DR-mapping contexts, as assessed by comparing the 95% confidence intervals between condi-
tions (Table 4).
To assess the sensitivity of the model-based time constant estimation, we simulated a leaky
integration model to generate many psychometric functions and repeated the same time con-
stant estimation procedure (i.e., based on exponential fits as described in Materials and Meth-
ods) on these psychometric functions. In a simple leaky integration model, the integration time
constant is known precisely (inverse of the leak parameter), whereas the time constant is a
combination of leak and mutual inhibition in the more complex non-linear LCA described
above (see Materials and Methods and [37]). We used three different levels of leak correspond-
ing to time constants of 200, 400, and 600 ms, whereby 200 ms corresponds roughly to the me-
dian time constant estimate obtained from our behavioral data in all conditions (Fig 5B). Using
three motion coherence levels (7%, 11%, 15%) and six stimulus durations (as in our behavioral
experiments) we generated 300 simulated model responses per condition and repeated the
time constant estimation process 10,000 times, for each of the three different time constants.
The 95% confidence intervals of the resulting distributions of estimated time constants did not
overlap (Fig 6). We conclude that our estimation procedure was sufficiently sensitive for distin-
guishing differences in time constants of 200 ms.
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Discussion
Here, we examined how knowledge of sensory-motor contingencies [41,42] affects the time-
scale of perceptual evidence integration into visual motion discrimination decisions, on a
short-term (trial-by-trial) or long-term (across thousands of trials) basis. We found that all
subjects integrated visual motion signals across time, and that their behavioral performance
was well accounted by a leaky competing accumulator [37] model. However, integration time-
scales were generally shorter than optimal for the task (median joint points of ~450 ms), in
which subject had to integrate evidence for up to 4.8 s. Finally, we found that neither subjects’
knowledge of a (variable) sensory-motor contingency, nor their long-term learning of one
(fixed) contingency, had a significant and consistent effect on their integration timescale. Al-
though we used two independent analytic approaches (model-independent and model-based)
for estimating integration timescales which yielded consistent results, and established the sensi-
tivity of our analyses, there was no evidence for a difference in integration timescales between
the experimental conditions. We, therefore, conclude that long-term learning (under fixed
Table 3. LCAmodel parameters and goodness of fit.
Condition Subject β κ s I0 m -LL c2(1, N = 29) p
“Pre” 1 0.282 0.133 1.528 0.646 0.837 73.041 3.78 1.000
2 0.497 0.020 1.696 -0.021 0.806 74.444 7.70 1.000
3 0.436 0.028 2.379 -0.055 0.767 70.6333 7.17 1.000
4 0.270 0.557 1.909 -0.064 0.381 88.095 6.03 1.000
5 0.359 0.006 0.929 0.129 0.883 100.468 10.87 0.999
“Post” 1 0.126 0.090 2.403 0.507 0.985 61.137 4.33 1.000
2 0.019 0.036 2.613 0.858 1.033 62.749 4.69 1.000
3 0.061 0.063 9.181 1.125 1.371 40.263 2.06 1.000
4 0.173 0.123 0.532 0.818 0.591 96.489 15.19 0.989
5 0.257 0.110 2.178 0.484 1.083 76.182 6.17 1.000
6 0.772 0.002 1.680 -0.237 0.732 61.299 3.79 1.000
“Fixed” 1 0.155 0.084 1.025 0.403 0.728 83.117 17.68 0.951
2 0.179 0.011 1.622 -0.136 0.663 74.168 4.86 0.999
3 0.176 0.093 1.449 0.456 0.672 65.839 8.25 0.999
6 0.447 0.046 2.739 0.118 1.012 64.579 10.80 0.999
Parameters: inhibition β, leak k, sensitivity s, baseline activity (I0) and coherence saturation (m). See Materials for description of the meaning of these
parameters.-LL, χ2and p are the negative log likelihood of the best-ﬁtting parameters, the chi-square value and the p-value respectively.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0129473.t003
Table 4. Model-based time constant estimates.
Subject “Pre” “Post“ “Fixed”
1 0.151 (0.112, 0.212) 0.100 (0.038, 0.162) 0.093 (0.017, 0.169)
2 0.255 (0.221, 0.314) 0.197 (0.145, 0.251) 0.195 (0.152, 0.237)
3 0.170 (0.142, 0.192) 0.305 (0.251, 0.360) 0.178 (0.146, 0.210)
4 N/A 0.141 (0.087, 0.196) —
5 0.190 (0.124, 0.255) 0.111 (0.032, 0.190) —
6 — 0.273 (0.137, 0.409) 0.184 (0.124, 0.243)
Numbers are estimates of time constant (τ) and 95% conﬁdence intervals.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0129473.t004
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mapping) or rapid acquisition (under variable mapping) of sensory-motor contingencies have
only a small, if any, effect on the mechanisms limiting the timescale of perceptual decisions.
Many studies have used free response protocols, in which the observer controls the decision
time, to study the dynamics of perceptual decision-making [8,9,31,37,46]. Evidence integration
is then inferred from fitting a decision model to the reaction time distributions [2,3,8,37]. Reac-
tion times do not only reflect the integration process, but also the observer’s speed-accuracy
tradeoff [3,6,8,9,47]. By contrast, in the interrogation protocol used in the present study, the
optimal strategy is to integrate all available evidence (perhaps subject to inevitable leak), and
then choose the option that is best supported by the integrated evidence when the response is
prompted [3,37]. Thus, the improvement of threshold as a function of stimulus duration
should directly reflect the evidence integration process.
Previous studies of perceptual decision-making in humans and animals using this approach
yielded a wide range of integration timescales. Some studies of human motion discrimination
found timescales on the order of several seconds [26,27]. One study in rats and humans showed
close-to-perfect integration, within a range of ~1 s using a task where participants had to dis-
criminate the relative frequency of discrete events [29]. Another human study showed thresh-
old decreases throughout a range of 900 ms—crucially, this decrease was steeper when subjects
expected longer signals compared to when they expected shorter signals [13]. The relatively
short timescales observed in the current study are in line with previous results from monkeys
[28] in motion discrimination: In particular, using stimuli and tasks analogous to our fixed
DR-mapping condition, Kiani et al. [28] found that monkeys exhibited a joint point of ~420
ms, just like our current human results. The human studies with larger samples sizes perform-
ing the same task also observed a substantial inter-individual variability in integration time-
scales [13]. Taken together, these results may suggest that integration timescale may, just like
short-term memory capacity, be an individual trait with an upper limit, which can only be
adapted to task demands within that limited range [13]. Additionally, the length of the tempo-
ral integration window may differ across different tasks.
Limited integration timescales are consistent with two mechanistically distinct scenarios.
First, the decision process may terminate prematurely, once the integrated evidence has
reached an implicit absorbing bound (termed “bounded diffusion”) [28]. This strategy can be
compared to “closing the eyes” after an initial decision is made, thus eliminating the impact
of the subsequently presented evidence. Second, the limit may be explained using a leaky
Fig 6. Sensitivity of the model-based timescale estimation. Sensitivity of the model-based timescale
estimation. Three distributions of estimated time constants obtained by simulating leaky integrator models
with three different time constants (0.2, 0.4, 0.6 s). Vertical lines indicate the 2.5% and 97.5% quantiles. The
overlap between the distributions is small (<5%).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0129473.g006
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competing accumulation process, as postulated by the LCA model that we used here [38,48].
If the leak parameter exceeds inhibition then the model implements a stable Ornstein-Uhlen-
beck (leaky integration) process, with integration taking place only until the stable state is
reached [3]. When the inhibition parameter is larger than leak, the model has unstable dy-
namics and is maximally sensitive to early evidence, in close resemblance to the bounded dif-
fusion model. Both the implicit boundary and LCA dynamics might also work in concert,
and to different extent in different individuals. The current findings establish that, whatever
the mechanism limiting the integration time scale, this mechanism seems unaffected by sen-
sory-motor mapping.
The variable DR-mapping forced observers to establish and remember a new association be-
tween decision and response on each trial, whereas the fixed mapping allowed them to establish
an automatic sensory-motor transformation, presumably after a few hundred trials of practice
[49]. Specifically, maintaining a new DR-mapping rule online during the decision formation
(“Pre”-condition) increased short-term memory load [49,50], which may have interfered with
the integration process. This difference in task demand seemed not to affect the behavioral per-
formance measures–neither the mean integration timescales, nor the frequency of simple
motor errors (lapse rates; Table 1).
Our results have a number of implications for neurophysiological studies of perceptual deci-
sion-making. First, several studies into the neural basis of decision-making have used a manipu-
lation analogous to our “Post-condition” to decouple decision-making from action planning
[12,23,42,51–54]. Our present results indicate that these studies, in fact, probe decision dynamics
analogous to those occurring in the classical tasks with fixed mapping. Second, our observation
of limited integration time scales question an assumption that has been implicit in several fMRI
and neurophysiological studies using interrogation protocols [16,20,21,30,50,53–55]: that observ-
ers integrate all sensory information provided, even for extended (> 1 s) stimulus durations. Our
results indicate that this assumption should be verified for each experimental condition and sub-
ject. Finally, our findings shed new light on the build-up activity commonly observed during de-
cision formation in motor structures of the human brain [21,22,23,45,56]: Albeit providing a
useful neural marker of the evolving integration process, this activity seems to be a downstream
consequence of the integration process rather than a direct correlate of that process. Our results
are consistent with a growing body of physiological evidence [23,53,57–59] indicating that evi-
dence integration during decision-making is distinct from action planning.
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